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Abstract

The Internet and its overwhelming possibilities and applications have changed the way
individuals carry out many routine activities such as going to work or school, or socializing.
Social networking sites such as Facebook are ideal settings for interacting with others, and
unfortunately, are also ideal settings for committing cybercrimes. The purpose of this study is to
investigate the occurrence of online offending against individuals, specifically harassment,
stalking, impersonation, and sexting. Self-report surveys collected from a sample of 274 college
students were examined using a negative binomial statistical analysis to determine possible
relationships between risky online and offline lifestyles as well as social learning factors and the
perpetration of cybercrime. The results indicate moderate support for the application of lifestyleroutine activity theory and social learning theory to cybercrime offending. Possible policy
implications as well as suggestions for future research are discussed.
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Introduction
The Internet, social networking sites, and online communication have changed the way
individuals communicate and interact. This includes the occurrence of cybercrime. For example,
many people routinely release personal information and pictures online which increases their
vulnerability to crimes such as cyber stalking or identity theft. The ease by which offenders can
access information online is a reason for concern and calls for more research to be done on the
subject of cybercrime offending. The purpose of this study is to examine possible factors that
increase the likelihood of cybercrime offending, specifically harassment, stalking,
impersonation, and sexting, using a secondary data analysis research design. Cohen, Kluegel,
and Land’s (1981) lifestyle-routine activity theory, and Aker’s (1994) social learning theory will
be applied to the examination and analysis of surveys completed by a sample of college students
at a Massachusetts university.
Although the study of cybercrime is in its early stages, it is a phenomenon that can have
devastating consequences. A 2002 study by Spitzberg and Hoobler found that 31% of
undergraduae student participants experienced some kind of personal online victimization. In a
similar study performed in 2011, 42% of social network uses reported experiencing some form
of interpersonal victimization on-line (Henson et al., 2011).
Cybercrimes, unlike physical crimes, have the potential to affect virtually anyone who
uses the Internet. In our modern society which relies so heavily on technology, this means that
the vast majority of our population is at risk. Additionally, investigating and prosecuting
cybercriminals can be difficult. Often, because the crime takes place over the Internet instead of
in a physical location, there is no clear jurisdiction. This means that law enforcement authorities
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and policy makers are unclear as to who is responsible for enforcing penalties and what those
penalties should be.
There are also a variety of definitions and categorizations of cybercrimes that make the
challenges of both researching and prosecuting them more difficult. For example, researchers
have begun to make a distinction between ‘cybercrime’ and ‘computer crime’. Cybercrimes are
characterized as crimes that have existed before the internet, but have taken on a new life in
cyberspace, such as theft, harassment, stalking and pornography. In contrast, computer crimes
are crimes that have emerged with the creation of the internet and would not be possible to
commit without it, such as hacking and spreading viruses.
The four crimes being investigated in the current study are categorized as cybercrimes,
rather than computer crimes, and include cyber harassment, cyber stalking, cyber impersonation,
and sexting. Cyber harassment consists of verbally harassing someone online, including
spreading rumors or threatening someone. Cyber stalking is simply stalking someone in the
electronic format. This may include frequently visiting or checking someone’s social networking
site, and the victim may be unaware that they are being stalked. Cyber impersonation, sometimes
referred to as the popular-culture term ‘catfishing’, involves an individual impersonating another
online. The individual may use another’s personal information and photographs in order to pose
as someone they are not while online. Finally, sexting refers to the sharing of sexually explicit
photos or videos over the internet. Although there are other cybercrimes worth investigating,
such as cyberbullying, cyber sexual harassment/violence, and pornography, only the four
described here will be analyzed within the current study.
As the scientific community begins to explore cybercrime, it will be helpful to better
understand the possible factors that increase the likelihood of cybercrime offending. The current
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study analyzes a secondary data set in order to further the understanding of cybercrime
offending. The purpose of the study is to determine whether risky online lifestyles and routine
activities, as well as social learning factors conducive to crime, increase the likelihood of
committing cybercrime against individuals. Based on existing literature, it is hypothesized that
those who do not conceal their identity online, who engage in risky online and offline behaviors,
who do not utilize digital guardianship and security management, who differentially associate
with deviant peers online, and who hold definitions favorable to crime, will be more likely to
commit the cybercrime offences of cyber harassment, stalking, impersonation, and sexting. The
study utilizes negative binomial statistical analysis and theoretical application to offer
suggestions for future research and possible policy implications.

Literature Review
Theoretical Framework
Lifestyle and Routine Activity Theory (LRAT) is an integrated theoretical approach that
has been widely used to study criminal victimization (Miethe & Meier, 1994; Osgood et al.,
1996; Schreck, Wright, & Miller, 2002; Sampson & Wooldridge, 1987; Svensson & Pauwels,
2010). Borrowing concepts from both lifestyle-exposure (Hindelang, Gottfredson, & Garofalo,
1978) and routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Felson, 1994), LRAT is described as
an “opportunity model” of victimization where motivated offenders and suitable targets converge
in the ansence of capable guardians. Lifestyle explanations argue that victimization is a result of
certain routine activities and behaviors, which increase exposure to motivated offenders and
decrease exposure to capable guardins (Cohen, Kluegel, & Land, 1981). Before the integrated
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theory can be applied to cyber-crime offending, it is important to first introduce and expand on
the concepts of both lifestlye-exposure and routine activity theories independently.

Lifestyle-Exposure Theory
Hindelang, Gottfredson, and Garofalo’s (1978) lifestyle exposure theory states that an
individual’s everyday lifestyles, referring to routine activities, influence the amount of exposure
to places and times where there is a higher risk of victimization. The theory states that lifestyles
are routine, that the risk of victimization is not differentially exposed, and that the relationships
between demographic characteristics and personal victimization can be attributed to lifestyle
differences (Hindelang, Gottfredson, & Garofalo, 1978). In other words, if an individual engages
in risky lifestyle behaviors, they are more likely to experience victimization than an individual
who persists from risky behavior.
The two major tenants of lifestyle-exposure theory are an individual’s vocational and
leisure activities. These include concepts such as social interaction and social activities such as
work, school, and leisure activities. The importance of how these real-world concepts can be
applied to the cyber-world will be discussed further with the LRAT model.

Routine Activity Theory
According to routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Felson, 1994), criminal
events occur when three essential elements converge in space and time in the course of daily
activities: (a) a potential offender with the capacity to commit a crime; (b) a suitable target or
victim, and (c) the absence of a capable guardian. If one or more of these three necessary
elements are absent, the chance of a crime occuring is decreased.
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Often in social science research, the concept of a motivated offender is considered fairly
constant, and therefore, is not included as a measured variable. Therefore, variables that may
affect an increase or decrease in suitable targets and capable guardians are more frequently
examined. Although this can be seen as a limitation to the theory, alternative approaches have
been taken by researchers to expand its theoretical framework.
For example, according to Mustaine and Tewskbury (2000), routine activity theory can
be successfully applied not only to criminal victimization, but also to offending. More
specifically, the likelihood of offending is most usefully explained by demographics and
partcipation in other illict behavrios, which is identifiable by varying lifestyle measures
(Mustaine & Tewksbury, 2000). This concept, as well as the idea that victims and offenders have
numerous shared characteristics and behaviors (Mustaine & Tewksbury, 2000), will be applied to
the current study using lifestyle and routine activity theory.

Lifestyle and Routine Activity Theory (LRAT)
As an integrated theory, LRAT stresses the idea that whether individuals encounter
criminal events depends mainly on the kind of places (setting) in which an individual spends
their free time, with whom they spend their free time, and what kind of activities they engage in
during their free time (Svensson & Pauwels, 2010). The lifestyle theory concepts of vocational
and leisure activities are integrated with the routine activity concept of a suitible target. Accoring
to LRAT, an individual’s lifestyle routine activities and behaviors are what makes him or her
suitable targest (Cohen, Kluegel, & Land, 1981).
The major components of the theory include (1) proximity to crime, (2) exposure to
potential offenders, (3) target attractiveness, and (4) guardianship (Cohen, Kluegel, & Land,
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1981). The current study assumes that proximity to crime is assumed, given the infinate and
ananymous nature of the Internet. Exposure to potential offenders is measured as an individual’s
capacity to conceal their personal identity while online, and will be referred to as ‘online
identity’. Target attactiveness is considered by a range of measures dealing with online and
offline routine activities and behavriors. The lifestyle exposure variables regarding risky offline
activities used in the current study include activities such as frequenting bars, clubs, house
parties, alcohol and drug use, speeding, and drunk driving. Risky online behavior will be
conceptualized as social networking, vocational and leisure activities. Finally, guardianship is
measured by varying levels of online security management.This includes measures ranging from
privacy settings on personal networking sites to installing virus and firewall software. A further
explanation of measurements and definitions will be discussed in the literature review and
methodology sections of this report.
As an integrated theory, LRAT has been applied to both quantitative and qualitative
analysis, as well as both micro and macro level structures. LRAT has also been applied to a
range of outcome measures such as property crime, violent crime, (Cohen & Felson, 1979;
Schreck, Wright, & Miller, 2002), and cybercrime (Choi, 2008). Before applying LRAT to the
current study, there are two important factors to take into consideration.
First, although LRAT has been applied to a variety of crimes in the physical world, its
application to cybercrime is limited. Secondly, while research has recently begun to explore the
application of LRAT to cybercrime, most existing literature is focused on victimization rather
than offending. This is true for both physical and cyber victimization (Choi, 2008; Holt &
Bossler, 2009; Reyns, Henson, & Fisher, 2011; Wilsem, 2013).
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For example, Choi (2008) applied LRAT to individual victimization through computer
crimes, particularly computer hacking. Choi (2008) argues that one of the three tenets, capable
guardianship, contributes to the computer-crime victimiztion model more than the others. This is
because the ease of accessing the Internet makes the possibility of motivated offenders and
suitable targets limitless.
As mentioned, the existing research that has successfully applied LRAT to offending
(Maxfield, 1987; Nofziger & Kurtz, 2005; Svensson & Pauwels, 2010; Wikstrom & Butterworth,
2006) has strictly focused on crimes committed in the physical world. Although this is a
considerable limitation to the current study, it also presents an opportunity to explore an area of
empirical research that is novel and relevant.
The current study applies the theoretical concepts discussed here in order to test the
relationship between routine activity and lifestyle variables and cybercrime offending. The
current study hypothesizes that failing to conceal ones identity, engaging in both risky online and
risky offline lifestyles, and not utilizing digital guardianship, will increase the likelihood of
cybercrime offending. Specifically, greater levels of exposure to offenders, target attractiveness,
and lower levels of guardianship will increase the likelihood of cybercrime offending. This
would indicate a relationship between demographic characteristics, offending, and lifestyle
differences.

Social Learning Theory
Akers’ (1985; 1998) social learning theory is based on a behavioral learning approach. In
fact, social learning theory was originally a reformulation of Sutherland’s (1937) differential
association theory. Akers utilizes the concepts of learned behavior and differential association, or
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the principle that a person commits criminal acts because he or she has learned definitions
favorable to crime (Sutherland, 1937). Akers’ social learning theory incorporates the idea of
differential association as well the additional concepts of definitions, differential reinforcement,
and imitation.
The first major component of social learning theory, differential association, refers to the
people that an individual associates with and how interactions with others who engage in a
certain type of behavior can affect the individual’s patterns of norms and values (Akers, 1985;
1998). Family and friends are the primary groups that an individual associates with. Akers posits
that associations that occur earlier, last longer, occur more often, and involve more important
relationships will have the greatest effect on behavior (1985; 1998).
Akers’ (1985; 1998) second major concept is definitions, or attitudes/meanings that one
attaches to certain behaviors. These definitions determine if an individual considers an act as
right or wrong, desirable or undesirable, justifiable or unjustifiable. Thus, if an individual holds
definitions favorable to committing crime, the more likely they will be to engage in deviant
behavior.
The third component of social learning theory is differential reinforcement. This refers to
the relationship between anticipated and actual rewards and punishments that follow a behavior
(Akers, 1985; 1998). If an individual commits deviant acts frequently but does not get caught, or
is rewarded financially, emotionally, etc., he or she will be more likely to continue behaving this
way. The final concept, imitation, refers to observing behavior that others are engaging in, and
then engaging in that behavior yourself (Akers, 1985; 1998). The current study will focus on two
of the four concepts of social learning theory, differential association and definitions.
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Similar to LRAT, social learning theory can be expanded to consider crimes committed
both in the physical world as well as cybercrime. The element of differential association can be
applied to the question of how the “friends” an individual makes online affect the likelihood of
participating in a risky online activity. Definitions can also be applied to online behavior.
Definitions of what constitutes risky behavior online can be dependent on whether the individual
involved considers the behavior to be acceptable.
The elements of LRAT and social learning theory discussed will be helpful in analyzing
the secondary data analysis proposed in the current study. The further operationalization and
application of the proposed variables will be discussed further in methodology section of this
report.

Theoretical Application to Cybercrime
As cybercrime is a relatively new phenomenon, it is difficult to contribute a concrete or
universal definition. According to Yar (2005), the term cybercrime might signify a range of illicit
activities whose common distinction is the central role played by networks of information and
communication technology. Satish, Dayanandra and Harish (2011) offer a similar definition,
“cybercrime is said to be those species, of which, genus is the conventional crime, and where
either the computer is an object or subject of conduct constituting crime” (34). The authors list
terminologies of cybercrime as hacking, service attack, virus dissemination, software piracy,
pornography, fraud, extortion, cyberstalking, and threatening (Satish, Dayananda, & Harish,
2011).
There is, in fact, an important clarification within the existing research that Satish,
Dayanara and Harish (2011) seem to miss. Although the authors allude to it in their definition,
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they fail to categorize between what Yar (2005) describes as ‘computer-assisted crimes’ (those
crimes that pre-date the Internet but take on a new life in cyberspace, e.g. fraud, theft,
harassment, stalking, pornography) and ‘computer focused crimes’ (those crimes that have
emerged in tandem with the establishment of the Internet and could not exist apart from it, e.g.
hacking, virus attack, website defacement) (409). This categorization is identical to the one made
previously in this report regarding cybercrimes versus computer crimes. The current study will
focus on cyber-focused, or cybercrimes, rather than computer-focused, or computer crimes.
Specifically, the current study will focus on four cybercrimes that are committed against
individuals, cyber harassment, cyber stalking, cyber impersonation, and sexting. Definitions for
these crimes can be taken broadly from Yar’s (2005) categorization of cybercrimes. Yar (2005)
gives five categories of cybercrimes: cyber-trespass, cyber-deceptions, cyber-pornography, and
cyber-violence. Cyber-violence is defined as “doing physical harm to, or inciting physical harm
against others, thereby breaching laws pertaining to the protection of the person, e.g. hate speech,
stalking” (Yar, 2005, p410). When applied to this study, that definitions encompasses both cyber
harassment and cyber stalking. More specifically, Lipton (2011) defines cyber harassment as
“behavior that annoys or distresses the victim,” while cyber stalking refers to “stalking in the
electronic format” (p.48)
The crime of cyber impersonation best fits under Yar’s (2005) categories of cybertrespass and cyber-deceptions, which she defines as “crossing boundaries into other people’s
property and/or causing damage” and “…intellectual property violations” (p.410). The concept
of cyber impersonation can also be more informally defined as what has become known in
popular culture as “catfishing,” defined as “The phenomenon of Internet predators that fabricate
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online identities and entire social circles to trick people into emotional/romantic relationship”
(Urban Dictionary, 2013).
The term sexting is most closely related to Yar’s (2005) cyber-pornography category,
defined as, “activities that breach laws on obscenity and decency” (p.410). More specifically,
sexting refers to “sending sexual images, videos, and sometimes sexual texts via a cell phone and
other electronic devices” (Mitchell, Finkelhor, Jones, & Wolak, 2012). It is important to mention
that measures of three related crimes, cyber sexual harassment and cyber prostitution, were
collected in the original survey, but are not included in the results and discussion of the current
study because of a low response rate and a lack of significant results. This, along with other
limitations to the current study, will be discussed further in the discussion section of this report.
As mentioned, existing literature on cybercrime is somewhat limited. Thus, there is no
existing research that looks at the same four offending variables that the current study has chosen
to examine. Additionally, the majority of research focuses on cyber victimization rather than
offending. However, what has been made evident is that cybercrime is a serious problem that
requires a closer look and varying perspectives. Holt and Bossler’s (2009) study is an example of
research that focuses on cyber victimization and the successful application of LRAT to
cybercrime. Although the study only found limited results for LRAT measures on victimization,
it did make some interesting points about the relationship between victimization and offending.
The authors found that individuals who commit cybercrime/deviance are also more likely to be
victimized themselves (Holt & Bossler, 2009). This phenomenon is frequently referred to as
‘victim/offender overlap’, and components of it will be explored within the current study.
Another study that found similar results was performed by Reyns, Henson and Fisher
(2011) applying what is referred to as ‘cyberlifestyle-routine activities theory’ to cybercrime
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victimization, specifically cyberstalking. The authors found that the most significant predictor of
cyberstalking victimization was self-reported online deviance. Online deviance was defined as
(a) repeatedly contacting or attempting to contact someone online after the person asked/told the
respondent to stop, (b) repeatedly harassing or annoying someone online after the person
asked/told the respondent to stop, (c) repeatedly making unwanted sexual advances toward
someone, (d) repeatedly speaking to someone in a violent manner or threatening to physically
harm him or her online after he or she asked/told the respondent to stop, (e) attempting to hack
into someone’s online social network account, (f) downloaded music of movies illegally, (g) sent
sexually explicit images to someone online or through text messaging, and (h) received sexually
explicit images from someone online or through text messaging. The authors suggest that this
finding is consistent with previous literature examining the overlap between offending and
victimization (Reyns, Henson, & Fisher, 2011; Jennings et al., 2010). More importantly, the
findings demonstrate support for this this relationship to be applied to online environments and
cybercrime research (Reyns, Henson, & Fisher, 2011).
A more recent study by Wilsem (2013) collected data from a representative sample of
5,750 Dutch residents to analyze their online routine activities, level of self-control, and past
victimization, specifically for hacking and harassing. The authors found that online deviance,
defined as respondents’ self-reports of either harassing someone online or sending a computer
virus during the past year, proved to be an important predictor of higher harassment risk
(Wilsem, 2013).
While findings on victimization and the ‘victimization/offending overlap’ are obviously
meaningful and useful, it is also important to examine factors specifically pertaining to
offending. One recent study by Marcum, Higgins and Ricketts (2014) looked at cybercrime
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offending, specifically cyber stalking behaviors, among adolescents. The authors were interested
in determining possible risk factors by applying general theory of crime and social learning
theory to data collected from high school students in a rural county in North Carolina. The
authors define stalking as repeatedly intruding on another in a manner that produces fear or
distress, and cyber stalking as stalking in an electronic format (Marcum, Higgins, & Ricketts,
2014; McEwan, Mullen, MacKenzie, & Ogloff, 2009).
The authors note that unlike physical stalking, cyber stalking is perpetrated less by
intimate partners and more by acquatances or strangers (Marcum, Higgins, & Ricketts, 2014;
Bocji, 2004). Additionally, the authors note that motivations of cyber stalkers can be gouped into
two categories: technological and social factors. This means that greater knowledge and skills of
the Internet, as well as a high level of anonymity, allow for the use of deceptive practices and a
greater likelihood of deviant cyber behavior. The study found that lower levels of self control
and higher levels of deviant peer association were both significantly related to an increase is
cyber stalking behavior among the adolescent sample (Marcum, Higgins, & Ricketts, 2014).
Holt, Burruss and Bossler (2010) also performed a study applying social learning theory
to cyber crime offending. Specifically, the authors measure the occurance of software and media
piracy, pornography, plagarism, and hacking. The findings from the study support previous
research regarding the relationships between social learning components and cyber crime
(Higgins & Wilson, 2006; Skinner & Fream, 1997; Holt, Burruss, & Bossler, 2010). These
findings suggest that both differential association with deviant peers and holding definitions
favorable to violation of the law are significantly related to an increase in cyber crime offending.
While there is existing research supporting the application of social learning to
cybercrime offending, other research considering LRAT and cybercrime offending in general, is
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lacking. It is the aim of this study to consider these factors and hopefully add to the further
understanding and research regarding cybercrime. Suggestive of the existing literature, risky
online and offline behavior as well as social learning factors conducive to crime are expected to
increase the likelihood of cybercrime offending.

Research Design & Methodology
The data used in the current study was collected in the spring of 2014. The survey items
were derived from a 2013 Korean Institute of Criminology Survey and from Choi’s (2008)
dissertation on computer crime victimization and were approved by the university’s Institutional
Review Board (IRB). Data were collected from self-report surveys given to a random sample of
college students from a Massachusetts college. The purpose of the study was to examine how
lifestyle-exposure and social learning theory relate to online victimization, specifically online
sexual victimization. While the survey included questions pertaining to offending as well as
victimization, the report did not consider the questions regarding offending in the final analysis
and discussion.
The current study utilizes the secondary data analysis research design to further explore
and analyze the 2014 survey data with a focus on cybercrime offending. Although the data are
valid and reliable, it is important to note the primary limitations. First, the sample used in the
study was heavily skewed towards criminal justice majors, meaning that it was not representative
of all of the students in the varying majors within the university. Second, the results on offending
rates were also heavily skewed. Although only a small percentage of respondents reported past
offending behavior, any significant findings will be useful in expanding the existing knowledge
on cybercrime offending.
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Sample
In order to reflect the university population, stratified cluster sampling was used in the
original study. The adequate number of sampled students was obtained via randomly choosing
core liberal studies classes, taken by all majors, which were then stratified by class level (i.e.
freshman- 100 level, sophomore- 200 level, etc.). The computer program Statistical Package for
the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to generate a random numbered list of 39 classes to be
surveyed. However, only four of the randomly selected classes agreed to be surveyed. In order to
reach the minimum of ten surveyed classes, the researcher approached criminal justice faculty
and gained an additional eleven classes. A total of 271 students from 15 classes were included in
the sample. The mean age of the sample was 21.32 years old, with 49.5% female and 50.2%
male; 83.2% white and 16.8% non-white. The sample consisted of 6.9% freshman, 31.4%
sophomores, 31.4% juniors, 29.6% seniors, and 0.7% other.
Table 1 presents the comparison of demographics between the university population and
the sample. Although the sample differs from the population in gender and class distribution, it is
similar to the greater population in age and race. The sample, although slightly skewed, is still
representative of the university student population.

Table 1. Comparison of Sample and Population on Available Demographic
Characteristics. Sample (N=274)
Study Sample (N=274)
Demographic
Undergraduate Population
Characteristic
(N=9,684)
Age
Mean age

22

21.32

Female

58% (n=5,635)

49.5% (n=135)

Male

42% (n=4,049)

50.2% (n=137)

Gender
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Other

0.4% (n=1)

Race
White

83% (n=8,065)

83.2% (n=228)

Non-White

17% (n=1,619)

16.8% (n=46)

Freshman

19% (n=1,826)

6.9% (n=19)

Sophomore

21% (n=2,074)

31.4% (n=86)

Junior

27% (n=2,594)

31.4% (n=86)

Senior

32% (n=3,067)

29.6% (n=81)

Other

1% (n=133)

0.7% (n=2)

Class

Independent Variables
The independent variables in the current study include concepts from both LRAT and
social learning theory. The operationalization of each variable is represented in the different
survey questions. Referring to LRAT, six categories were identified for study: online identity
(exposure to offender); social networking site security, risky social networking site activities,
risky vocational activities, and risky leisure activities (target attractiveness); as well as digital
guardianship and security management (capable guardianship).

Lifestyle and Routine Activity Theory (LRAT)
Exposure to offender- Online Identity
The LRAT concept of exposure to offenders was conceptualized as online identity. This
variable combined two survey items: “I don’t use my actual name while on the Internet” and “I
tend to conceal my identity wile on the Internet.” The respondents were asked to choose between
‘Strongly Disagree,’ ‘Disagree,’ ‘No Opinion,’ ‘Agree,’ and ‘Strongly Agree,’ so that each scale
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represents the possible range of a minimum score of 2 indicating a minimal effort to conceal
identity, and a maximum score of 10 indicating high identification concealment . The mean score
for the online identity variable was 4.79 with a standard deviation of 2.09.

Target Attractiveness- Risky Online Social Networking Site, Leisure, and Vocational Activity
Risky online social networking site activity was operationalized by asking respondents,
on the ‘Strongly Disagree’ to ‘Strongly Agree’ scale, a series of six questions related to activities
and behaviors related to social networking sites (SNS). The survey items are as follows: “I share
most events in my life through pictures on SNS,” “I express my opinions and feelings via SNS,”
“I offer a lot of personal information on SNS,” “I frequently write about my life on SNS,” “I
express my opinion with honesty on SNS,” and “I express myself on very sensitive issues on
SNS.” The scale represents a possible minimum score of 6 indicating a low level of risky SNS
activity, and a maximum score of 30 indicating a high level of risky SNS activity. The mean
score for risky SNS activity was 15.12 with a standard deviation of 4.59.
Risky online leisure activity was operationalized by combining three survey items: “I
have downloaded free games from unknown web sites during the last 12 months,” “I have
downloaded free music from unknown websites during the last 12 months,” and “I have
downloaded free movies from unknown websites during the last 12 months.” The scale
represents a possible minimum score of 3 indicating a low level of risky online leisure behavior,
and a maximum score of 15 indicating a high level of risky online leisure activity. The mean
score for risky online leisure activity is 6.88 with a standard deviation of 2.72.
Risky online vocational activity was operationalized by combining four survey items: “I
opened any attachment in the e-mails that I received during the last 12 months,” “I opened any
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files or attachments I received through my instant messenger during the last 12 months,” “I
clicked on any website links in an e-mail that I received during the last 12 months,” and “I
clicked on a pop-up message that interested me during the last 12 months.” The scale represents
a possible minimum score of 4 indicating a low level of risky vocational activity, and maximum
score of 20 indicating a high level of risky online vocational activity. The mean score for risky
online vocational activity was 9.83 with a standard deviation of 3.49.

Capable Guardianship- Digital Guardianship, Security Management
The variable of digital guardianship was operationalized with the survey item: “I install
and update antivirus programs to block the information that I don’t want on my computer.” The
scale represents a possible minimum score of 1 indicating a low degree of digital guardianship,
and a maximum score of 5 indicating a high degree of digital guardianship. The mean score for
digital guardianship was 3.56 with a standard deviation of 1.18.
The variable of security management was operationalized with combination of two
survey items: “I have set strict privacy settings on who can see my pictures on SNS,” and “I
update the privacy settings on SNS frequently.” The scale represents a possible minimum score
of 2 indicating a low degree of security management, and a maximum score of 10 indicating a
high degree of security management. The mean score for security management was 7.15 with a
standard deviation of 1.78.
Additionally, risky offline behavior was measured by a series of questions regarding the
frequency of engaging in activities such as frequenting bars, clubs, house parties, alcohol and
drug use, as well as unsafe vehicular activities such as speeding and drunk driving.
Unfortunately, perhaps because these factors have traditionally been applied to the risk of
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victimization, the current study did not yield any significant results relating to risky offline
behavior. Therefore, the variables are not considered in the final analysis/discussion.

Social Learning Theory
Differential Association
The variable of differential association was operationalized by combining seven survey
items: “One of my role models violated cyber laws,” “My cyber friends commit crimes on the
Internet,” “I’ve learned how to violate Internet laws through my peers online,” “People who
commit crimes on the Internet are treated well around me,” “Committing a crime on the Internet
is very common to me,” “I frequently see my close friends committing crimes online,” and “I
have a strong bond with people on SNS who harass people.” The scale represents a possible
minimum score of 7 indicating a low level of differential association with delinquent peers, and a
maximum score of 28 indicating a high level of differential association with deviant peers. The
mean score for differential association was 15.19 with a standard deviation of 4.50.

Definition
The variable of definition was operationalized by combining nine survey items: “We are
less likely to be punished due to violation of laws on the Internet,” “It is easy to violate laws
using the Internet,” “I can easily commit crimes on the Internet,” “If I commit a crime on the
Internet, I won’t get caught,” “If I commit a crime on the Internet, I won’t be identified,” “I can
easily commit a crime on the Internet, I won’t be identified,” “I won’t feel guilty if I violate a
law on the Internet,” “I won’t be blamed if I violate laws on the Internet,” and “Committing a
crime on the Internet is acceptable to me.” The scale represents a possible minimum score of 9

Phillips 23

indicating a low level of definitions favorable to committing crime, and a maximum score of 36
indicating a high level of definitions favorable to committing crime. The mean score for
definitions was 22.25 with a standard deviation of 5.76.

Dependent Variables
The dependent variables being considered in the current study are examples of
cybercrime offending. The variables are operationalized as a series of yes/no questions related to
specific online activities engaged in the past twelve months. The four activities that will be
included in the present study are cyber harassment, cyber stalking, cyber impersonation, and
sexting.

Cyber Harassment
The variable of cyber harassment offending was operationalized by combining three
survey items: “I have verbally harassed someone on the Internet in the past 12 months”,
“I have spread rumors or untruthful facts online in the past 12 months”, and “I have threatened
someone online in the past 12 months.” Given that the variable was coded as dichotomous, the
scale represents a possible minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 3. The mean score for
cyber harassment offending was 0.13 with a standard deviation of .46.

Cyber Stalking
The variable of cyber stalking was operationalized with the dichotomous survey item: “I have
repeatedly stalked a person using the Internet in the past 12 months.” The mean score for cyber
stalking was 0.04 with a standard deviation of 0.20.
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Cyber Impersonation
The variable of cyber impersonation was operationalized with the dichotomous survey
item: “I have impersonated someone online in the past twelve months.” The mean score for
cyber impersonation was 0.02 with a standard deviation of 0.15.
Sexting
The variable for sexting was operationalized with the dichotomous survey item: “I have
spread private photos or movies taken without consent over the Internet in the past 12 months.”
The mean score for sexting was 0.02 with a standard deviation of 0.15. The descriptive statistics
for each variable are described in Table 2.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Study Measures
VARIABLES

Mean

SD

Minimum

Maximum

0.125
0.040
0.022
0.022

0.46
0.20
0.15
0.15

0
0
0
0

3
1
1
1

4.79

2.09

2

10

Risky Online SNS activity
Risky Online Leisure Activity

15.12
6.88

4.59
2.72

6
3

30
15

Risky Online Vocational Activity
Capable Guardianship

9.83

3.49

4

20

Digital Guardianship
Security Management

3.56
7.15

1.18
1.78

1
2

5
10

Social Learning
Differential association
Definition

15.19
22.25

4.50
5.76

7
9

28
36

Independent Variable
Cyber harassment
Cyber stalking
Cyber impersonation
Sexting
LRAT
Exposure to Motivated Offenders
Online identity
Target attractiveness

Dependent Variable
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Cyber Harassment

0.13

0.46

0

3

Cyber Stalking

0.04

0.20

0

1

Cyber Impersonation

0.02

0.15

0

1

Sexting

0.02

0.15

0

1

Results
The data used in the current study was examined using the Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSS) program. Because of the skewed nature of the data, negative binomial
regression analysis was considered to be the most appropriate technique. The distribution of
cybercrime offending was heavily skewed, indicating that the assumption of normality is
violated. Due to the nature of the dependent variable, negative binomial regression models were
used in order to achieve the most unbiased and consistent results.
The current study yielded six significant findings regarding the relationship between
elements of LRAT and Social Learning Theory and cyber-crime offending, and one significant
finding regarding victim/offender overlap. In this section, the results will be presented by
introducing the independent variables and discussing the significant relationships that each had
with the respective cybercrimes. The independent variables related to the LRAT framework will
be presented first, followed by the variables related to social learning theory. The significant
results based on the negative binomial analysis can be seen in Table 3.
Table 3. Inferential Statistics: Negative Binomial Regression
Cyber Harassment
B

SE

Odds
Ratio
(Exp(B))

Cyber Stalking
B

SE

Odds
Ratio
(Exp(B))

Cyber
Impersonation
B SE
Odds
Ratio
(Exp(B))

Sexting
B

SE

Odds
Ratio
(Exp(B))
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LRAT
Exposure to
Motivated
Offenders
Online
.59 .30
.56*
identity/
Gender
Target
Attractiveness
.22 .09
Risky online
SNS activity
Risky online
leisure activity
Risky online
vocational
activity
Social
Learning
.18 .05 1.20***
Differential
association
Definitions
.14 .05 1.16**

1.25*

.50 .26
.57 .31

1.64

1.78

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001

Exposure to Motivated Offenders- Online Identity/Gender & Cyber Harassment
The first LRAT variable, exposure to motivated offenders, was operationalized as an
individual’s capacity to conceal their personal identity while online. When this variable was
intercepted with the demographic variable of gender, it was found to have a significant effect on
the likelihood of cyber harassment offending. According to this result, females who conceal their
identity online are approximately 45% less likely to commit cyber harassment than females who
do not conceal their identity (b= -0.59, Odds Ratio= 0.56, p=.046). This finding is important
because it is the only result that indicated a negative correlation between the variables. The
importance and meaning of this finding will be discussed further in the discussion section of this
paper.
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Target Attractiveness
Risky Online SNS Activity & Cyber Stalking
The independent variable of risky online social networking site (SNS) activity refers to
the willingness of an individual to post/share information including pictures and personal
opinions on their social networking sites (i.e. Facebook). Risky online SNS activity was found to
be significantly related to cyber stalking. According to this result, those who engage in risky
behavior on SNS are 25% more likely to commit cyber stalking (b= 0.22, Odds Ratio= 1.25,
p=.016)

Risky Online Leisure Activity & Sexting
Risky online leisure activity refers to downloading games, movies and music from an
unknown website. This variable was found to have a moderately significant effect on the
likelihood of sexting. According to this result, respondents who engage in risky online leisure
activity are about 64% more likely to engage in sexting (b=0.49, Odds Ratio=1.64, p=.062). It is
important to note that the p value of .062 does not meet the p<.05 requirement to be identified as
statistically significant. Still, the result is included because it is only one hundredth of a percent
away, and it adds to the overall purpose of the study.

Risky Online Vocational Activity & Cyber Impersonation
The final of the three variables related to target attractiveness, risky online vocational
activity, refers to opening unknown emails, attachments, and pop-ups while online. This variable
was found to have a moderately significant effect on the likelihood of cyber impersonation.
According to this finding, those who engage in risky online vocational activities are

Phillips 28

approximately 78% more likely to commit cyber impersonation (b=0.57, Odds Ratio=1.78,
p=.066). As with the risky online leisure activity finding, the p value for this result does not meet
the p<.05 requirement. However, this result was included for the same reasons listed above.

Capable Guardianship- Digital Guardianship; Security Management
The LRAT concept of capable guardianship was operationalized as two separate
variables- digital guardianship and security management. While digital guardianship refers to
installing anti-virus software on a computer, security management refers to setting and updating
privacy settings on personal SNS pages. Neither of these variables was found to have a
significant effect on any of the observed cybercrimes.

Differential Association & Cyber Harassment
The first of the two variables relating to social learning theory, differential association,
refers to the level of association an individual has with delinquent peers while online. This
variable was found to have a significant effect on the likelihood of committing cyber harassment.
According to this result, those who differentially associate with deviant peers are 20% more
likely to commit cyber-harassment (b= 0.18, Odds Ratio=1.20, p=.001).

Definitions & Cyber Harassment
The second social learning variable, definitions, refers to opinions and beliefs that an
individual holds which are conducive to committing cybercrime, such as believing that it is easy
to commit crimes on the internet, and if you do, you will not get caught. This variable was found
to have a significant effect on the likelihood of committing cyber-harassment. According to his
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result, those who hold definitions favorable to cybercrime are 15% more likely to commit cyber
harassment (b=0.14, Odds Ratio=1.16, p=.002).

Victim/Offender Overlap
The current study also yielded a significant finding regarding cybercrime victim/offender
overlap. A bivariate correlation analysis was conducted to compare the four offense variables to
the four corresponding victimization variables (cyber harassment, stalking, impersonation, and
sexting). Of these, only the offense/victimization of sexting was found to have significant
correlation. In other words, out of the four cybercrimes, sexting was the only variable that
showed significance for participants both committing as well as being a victim of the offense.
The results for sexting victim/offender overlap are shown in Table 4.

Table 4. Victim/Offender Overlap- Sexting

Sexting- Victimization Pearson Correlation

Sexting- Victimization

Sexting- Offense

1

.130

Sig. (2-tailed)
Sum of Squares and
Cross-products

Sexting- Offense

.032*
22.719

1.473

Covariance

.083

.005

N

274

273

Pearson Correlation

.130

1

Sig. (2-tailed)

.032*

Sum of Squares and
Cross-products

1.473

5.868
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Covariance

.005

.022

N

273

273

*. Correlation is significant at the .005 level (2-tailed).

Discussion
The current study sought to explore how lifestyles, routine activities, and social learning
variable affect the likelihood of cybercrime offending against individuals among a sample of
college students. The four cybercrimes that were studied include cyber harassment, cyber
stalking, cyber impersonation, and sexting. This study hypothesized that risky online and offline
lifestyles, as well as social learning factors conducive to cybercrime, would increase the
likelihood of cybercrime offending.
The negative binomial regression analysis, as well as the bivariate correlation analysis to
examine victim/offender overlap, yielded seven significant results. These results will be
discussed relative to the existing literature as well as theoretical implications. Next, possible
policy implications will be explained. Finally, limitations of the study as well as suggestions for
future research will be explored.

Significance of Findings
According to the findings of this study, the LRAT elements that had significant effects on
the likelihood of cybercrime offending included online identity/gender, risky online SNS
activity, risky online leisure activity, and risky online vocational behavior. These results are
consistent with the original hypothesis that those who fail to conceal their identity online, who
engage in risky behavior online, who do not utilize digital guardianship, who associate with
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deviant peers, and who hold definitions favorable to committing crime, are more likely to
commit the cybercrimes of cyber harassment, stalking, impersonation, and sexting.
The findings from the current study also support existing research on cybercrime
offending. The significant victim/offender overlap for the occurrence of sexting is consistent
with Wilsem’s (2013) finding that online deviance proved to be an important predictor of
victimization risk. Additionally, the findings from the current study support the growing body of
research that suggests a strong relationship between social learning components and cybercrime
offending (Higgins & Wilson, 2006; Holt, Burress & Bossler, 2010; Skinner & Fream, 1997).
The current study is important to current and emerging literature because researchers and
policy makers can use this information to better understand the lifestyle factors that may
contribute to cybercrime offending. This means that education and prevention policy efforts can
be made to reduce the risk of offending and therefore make the internet a safer place for
individuals to engage in their daily routine activities, such as social networking and
communicating with others.
The first significant finding, that females who conceal their identity online are 45% less
likely to commit cyber harassment, is important because it is the only result that indicated a
negative correlation between variables. This shows that concealing ones identity online may
prevent an individual from committing cybercrime. This is meaningful because perhaps if people
are made aware of this, they may try harder to conceal their identity online. For example, people
may be less inclined to post personal information, such as their full name or address, while
online.
The LRAT variables for risky online activity, as well as the social learning variables for
differential association and definitions, were positively correlated with cybercrime offending.
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This means that those who engage in risky behaviors online, who associate with deviant peers
online, and who hold definitions favorable to committing crime, are more likely to commit
cybercrime. These findings are important because educational and preventative programs can use
this information to try to stop the occurrence of cybercrime. For example, if a preventative policy
can successfully educate people on the dangers of risky online activities such as posting personal
information, downloading games and videos from unknown websites, and becoming friends with
strangers on SNS pages, they may be less likely to engage in these activities, and therefore, less
likely to commit cybercrime.
On the other hand, the current study also found results that were inconsistent with the
original hypothesis. Specifically, the hypothesis assumed that those who utilize digital
guardianship and security management (anti-virus software and SNS privacy settings), and those
who engage in risky offline behavior (frequenting bars, clubs and house parties; alcohol and drug
use; unsafe vehicular activities such as speeding and drunk driving), would be more likely to
commit cybercrime. In fact, neither digital guardianship, security management, nor risky offline
behavior had a significant effect on cybercrime offending.
First, it is important to discuss that finding that neither digital guardianship nor security
management had a significant effect on cybercrime offending. It was assumed that both of these
variables reflecting the LRAT concept of capable guardianship would be a significant factor in
determining the likelihood of cybercrime offending. A possible explanation for this unexpected
finding is that the concept of capable guardianship, even in the cyber world, is more effective in
determining the likelihood of victimization rather than offending. Of course, downloading antivirus software or consistently updating privacy settings may prevent a potential victim from
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being targeted, but it may not prevent a would-be offender from committing a crime or deviant
act.
Second, the unexpected finding that risky offline behavior did not have a significant
effect on the likelihood of cybercrime offending is also important. This finding shows that the
relationship between online and offline routine activities is not as significant as originally
assumed. This means that people who engage in risky activities in the physical world may not
engage in risky activities while online, and vice versa. This is important for future researchers
and policy makers to understand because the framework and intent behind traditional education
and prevention programs aimed at reducing risky behaviors in the physical world- for example,
Big Brother Big Sister, or D.A.R.E- may need to be modified in order to be effective in the cyber
world. The finding from the current study, as well as the existing literature, suggest that a
completely new approach must be taken to combat cybercrime.
That being said, the significant results from the current study are evidence of at least
moderate support for the application of LRAT to cybercrime offending. Similarly, the significant
result for the effects of differential association and definitions conducive to cyber harassment
show moderate support for the application of social learning theory to cybercrime offending.
Additionally, the significant result for victim/offender overlap for the cybercrime of sexting
indicates moderate support for the claim that some individuals are both victims and offenders of
certain cybercrimes.
This means that concepts from both theories, LRAT and social learning, as well as the
victim/offender overlap model, may be applied to policy efforts as well as future research. Of
course, while the findings suggest that there is a relationship between certain lifestyle or social
learning variables and cybercrimes, they cannot explain why that relationship exists. However, it
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is important for the efforts of future research and policy that possible explanations for the
specific relationships found in this study be discussed.
For example, the significant relationship between risky online vocational activity and
cyber impersonation may be due to the fact that committing cyber impersonation requires the use
of communication tools such as email and instant messaging. Offenders must have access to
these mediums of communication in order to successfully impersonate another individual. Thus,
those who engage in risky online vocational activity may be more likely to commit cyber
impersonation.
Additionally, the significant relationship between the variable for online identity/gender
and cyber harassment may be logically explained as follows. The findings from the current study
suggest that females who make a greater effort to conceal their identity online are less likely to
commit cyber harassment and males who conceal their identity are more likely to commit cyber
harassment. This is perhaps because of a measurement issue mentioned previously in this report.
Females may be more likely to conceal their identity online as to protect themselves. For
example, an individual may use only their first name, or their first and middle name, instead of
their using their surname. Males, on the other hand, may be more likely to not use their real
name in an attempt to deceive a potential victim. This would allow the offender to harass the
victim while remaining anonymous. Of course, these explanations have not been verified and are
only suggestions that future research may take into consideration.
Overall, the results indicate that those who conceal their identity online, who exhibit
risky behavior while online, who differentially associate with deviant peers online, and who hold
definitions favorable to committing crime, are more likely to commit cybercrime. These finding
call to attention some important theoretical implications. Although emerging academic research
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is beginning to apply LRAT and social learning theory to cybercrime, the majority of existing
literature has focused on victimization and ignored offending. The current study is the first of its
kind to apply both LRAT and social learning theory to cybercrime offending.
Additionally, the majority of existing research that has studied cybercrime offending has
focused on computer-based crime rather than cybercrime. Cybercrimes that are committed
against individuals, although they do not represent the monetary value that computer crimes do,
can be detrimentally harmful to victims. Furthermore, as this study has shown, individuals who
are victims of these crimes may also be taking part in committing the crimes against others. The
dangerous consequences of cybercrime, as well as the nuances associated with it, such as
anonymity and its global scale, indicate that this is a serious problem that requires more attention
from both researchers and policy makers.

Policy Implications
Currently, similar to the existing literature, existing policy tends to focus on computerbased crime, such as fraud, hacking, etc., rather than cybercrimes like harassment, stalking,
impersonation, and sexting. Based on the literature review and results from the current study,
two possible policy implications will be suggested. First, because the study of cybercrime is
fairly new, and there is still much to be learned, it may be beneficial to being the policy
adaptation process by simply adding cyber-language to existing laws concerning crimes such as
harassment, stalking, identity theft, and pornography.
According to Lipton (2011), although laws aimed at real world activities often do not
transalte well when applied to cyberspace, there are some existing civil and criminal laws that
could potentially be adapted. Lipton (2011) gives five examples of existing federal laws that are
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most relevant to cybercrime: The Interstate Communications Act, the Telephone Harassment
Act, the Interstate Stalking Punishment and Prevention Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
and the Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act.
Two of these, the Telephone Harassment Act and the Interstate Stalking Punishment and
Prevention Act, will be discussed as they are the most closely related to the current study. The
Telephone Harassment Act, most recently ammended in 2013, prohibits “interstate or foreign
communications… which is obscene or child pornography, with intent to abuse, threaten, or
harass another person” (Telephone Harassment Act, 2013).
The revisions to the statute were intended to capture harassing emails. This means that
the statute will not cover situations where an Internet communication is not directed towards a
particular recipient. The law will also not apply to situations in which a perpetrator simply posts
information about the victim on a website, or where he poses as the victim (impersonation)
(Lipton, 2011).
The second statute, the Federal Interstate Stalking Punishment and Prevention Act
(FISPPA), amended in 2006, prohibits harassment and intimidation in “interstate or foreign
commerce” and now specifically extends to conduct that involves using “the mail, any
interactive computer service, or any facility of interstate or foreign commerce to engage in a
course of conduct that causes substantial emotional distress” (FISPPA, 2006). As with the
Telephone Harassment Act, the extent to which the “interstate or foreign commerce”
requirement will limit the potential application of the FISPPA is unclear (Lipton, 2011).
Based on these limitation, neither statute can be described as a comprehensive answer to
cybercrime legislation. However, it is a place to start. This approach of adapting existing statutes
in order to apply them to cybercrimes will allow victims some protection and hold offenders
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accountable, while also giving researchers and policy makers more time to fully understand
cybercrime before separate laws can be made to correspond with specific cybercrimes.
The second policy implication related to the current study is focused on education and
prevention. Similar to Flick’s (2009) claim, the current study proposes a policy approach
towards prevention rather than prosecution. One of the most promising approaches to cybercrime
education and prevention is the Stop.Think.Connect campaign presented by the Department of
Homeland Security.
According to the department’s website, “The Stop.Think.Connect campaign is a national
public awareness campaign aimed at increasing the understanding of cyber threats and
empowering the American public to be safer and more secure online” (Stop.Think.Connect,
2015). The purpose of the campaign is to equip educators and community leaders with the
information and resources necessary for lessons and discussions on online safety. Intended
audiences include college students, parents and educators, young professionals, small businesses,
industry professionals, government, law enforcement, and older adults. Although the program is
generally aimed at protecting potential victims, it can also be applied to possibly reduce the risk
of cybercrime offending.
The general approach can be broken down into three steps- stop, think, and connect. The
first step urges participants to stop others from accessing their accounts by setting secure
passwords, and to stop sharing too much personal information online. This step is directly
aligned with the current study’s interest in online identification (concealing identity) and risky
online SNS activity. According to the findings from the current study, females who conceal their
identity online are 45% less likely to commit cyber harassment than those who do not conceal
their identity. On the other hand, those who engage in risky SNS activity are 25% more likely to
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commit cyber stalking. This means that if people stop posting personal information, such as their
full name or private photos, they may be less likely to engage in deviant activity online.
The second step, Think, asks participants to think before you click, “Is this a trusted
source?” This step directly relates to the LRAT variable for risky online vocational activity,
which includes opening files, attachments, pop ups, or website links from emails or unknown
webpages. According to the results, those who engage in risky vocational behavior are 78% more
likely to commit the cybercrime of cyber impersonation. Being naïve to the dangers of the
internet and freely opening unknown attachments and links may increase the likelihood that an
individual will continue more serious deviant behavior online. Additionally, potential victims
may also be naïve to the dangers of the internet, and by engaging in risky vocational activity,
increase their vulnerability to a cyber-attack.
The final step, Connect, urges participants to connect wisely. For example, people should
be aware that not all wifi hotspots offer the same protections and that if a connection or site
doesn’t seem right, then you should close out or delete the file. This step can be related to the
measure of risky online leisure activity, which includes downloading free games, music or
movies from unknown websites. According to the study results, those who engage in risky online
leisure activity are 64% more likely to commit the cybercrime of sexting. This is why it is
important to educate people on the dangers of the internet, for both offenders and victims.
The Stop.Think.Connect campaign also offers five helpful tips specifically for college
students, which is the population of interest in the current study. 1) Protect all devices that
connect to the Internet, including computers, smart phones, gaming systems and other webenabled devices. 2) Keep social security numbers, account numbers, passwords, and other
personal information private. 3) Own your online presence. Set security privacy settings on
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social networking websites and think twice about what you are posting and saying online. 4)
Check to be sure the site is security enabled with https:// or “shttp://” when banking or shopping
online. 5) Think before you act. Be wary of messages that ask for personal information.
This policy refers to many of the variables discussed throughout the current study. The
Stop.Think.Connect campaign urges Internet users to protect their online identity, to avoid online
risky activity, and to utilize digital guardianship/security management, which are all concepts
related to LRAT. A suggestion to improve the policy is to also include components of social
learning theory. For example, in order to incorporate the concept of differential association, the
Stop.Think.Connect campaign may include a section of its education policy on why internet
users should be cautious about who they become ‘friends’ with online.
While the internet can be an amazing platform for connecting people from all corners of
the world, it can also be a place where strangers, and even criminals, can easily take advantage of
others. Cyber impersonation, or ‘catfishing’ as it is known in popular culture, happens when an
individual steals another individual’s identity and poses as that person while online. With this
disguise, an impersonator has a sense of anonymity that no other platform besides the internet
can offer. The offender may manipulate others, either for personal or even financial reasons. It is
also possible that, relative to the victim/offender overlap model, those who have been victimized
by this specific deviant act may turn around and become an offender, furthering the cycle of
victimization.
Additionally, the Stop.Think.Connect campaign may benefit from including the social
learning concept of definitions to its educational framework. As long as people believe that it is
acceptable to commit cybercrimes such as cyber harassment, stalking, impersonation and
sexting, they will probably continue to commit them. It is important to educate people about the

Phillips 40

possible consequences of their actions online. This includes civil/criminal penalties, as well as
the negative consequences that potential victims may experience. It is easy to forget, sitting in
front of a 2-dimensional computer screen, or staring at a cell phone that fits in the palm of your
hand, that there are real, live human beings on the other end. Our actions online, just like actions
in the physical world, have real consequences. And although the anonymity and ease of access to
the internet makes it difficult to humanize these actions, it is important that internet users
understand the need to act responsibly while online.
Hopefully, if more individuals are exposed to this type of educational program, there will
be less opportunities for offenders to engage in cybercrime. Additionally, potential victims will
be better prepared and protected. It is imperative that people who use the Internet- which ranges
from adolescents, to college students, to older adults- are educated on the potential dangers of
navigating the web. The Stop.Think.Connect program is a very useful education and awareness
tool for a variety of Internet users. Now that the findings and policy implications have been
discussed, limitations to the study as well as suggestions for future research will be offered.

Limitations and Future Research
The limitation of skewed data is very important to consider when discussing the results of
the current study. First, because the sample was drawn mostly from students within a distinct
major, it is not representative of the overall student population. This means that any findings
cannot be applied to the university population, or to college students in general. Secondly, the
number of respondents who answered affirmatively to cybercrime offending was very low. For
example, with a possible minimum score of 0 and maximum score of 3, the mean score for cyber
harassment was 0.125. With a possible minimum score of 0 and maximum score of 1, the means
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scores for cyber impersonation, stalking, and sexting, were 0.022, 0.040, and 0.007,
concurrently.
Another limitation of the current study is the exclusion of certain variables. As discussed
in the literature review, The LRAT framework includes four components: proximity to crime,
exposure to potential offenders, target attractiveness, and guardianship. The current study
excluded the component of proximity to crime because, because of the infinite and anonymous
nature of the internet, it was assumed that this variable is given. Additionally, the current study
intended to include the target attractiveness variable of ‘risky offline activity’. This variable was
excluded from the final results and discussion because it did not yield any significant results
when applied to the four dependent variables. It was decided to exclude the ‘offline’ variable so
that the theme of the study, cybercrime offending, would remain constant. The social learning
theoretical framework also includes four major components: differential association, definitions,
differential reinforcement, and imitation. The variables for differential reinforcement and
imitation were excluded from the current study because the concepts were not operationalized
through any of the survey items.
A final limitation is the accuracy of measurement of the variables used in the current
study. The independent and depend variables were operationalized as either dichotomous or
scale measures based on the corresponding survey questions. The language used in a number of
the survey questions could be considered inadequate or confusing. For example, the independent
variable for the LRAT concept of exposure to offenders was operationalized as ‘online identity’.
This variable combined two survey items: “I don’t use my actual name while on the Internet”
and “I tend to conceal my identity while on the internet.” A major problem with this
measurement is that some individuals may not use their actual name as a way to protect their
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identity, such as using a middle name instead of a last name. Others, however, may not use their
real name, or use an alias, as a way to deceive potential victims. It is important for future
research to consider the clarity of survey questions and consistency of definitions of terms.
While it is important to keep these limitations in mind, it is also helpful to look towards
future research so that we may continue to improve the investigative efforts into the phenomenon
of cybercrime. Moving forward, future research will benefit from working towards common
definitions of cybercrimes as well as computer-based crimes, so that policy may be better
formulated and individuals may be better educated. Future research should continue to apply
different theoretical approaches, including LRAT and social learning theory, and others such as
deterrence, or self-control theory, to cybercrime victimization and offending. Additionally, future
research will benefit from applying these theoretical approaches to different cybercrimes.
Although the current study focused on cyber harassment, stalking, impersonation and sexting,
there are various other offenses to be considered including cyberbullying, pornography, online
dating violence, and online sexual violence.

Conclusion
Although the phenomena of cybercrime is relatively new to scientific research, enough
information is available to make a strong argument that it is a serious problem and that more
research is required. It is important not only to study the risks and effects of victimization, but
also to focus on offending. Educational programs such as the Stop.Think.Connect campaign can
be adapted in order to inform internet users about how to protect themselves from risk, as well as
how to reduce the likelihood of offending. The freedom and anonymity of the internet can have a
dehumanizing effect, leading people to act in ways that they may not normally in the physical
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world, for example sharing personal information and opinions, private photos, and even
engaging in deviant behavior such as stalking or harassing other individuals online. The current
study argues that if we educate people on the potential dangers of the internet and of cybercrime,
perhaps they will behave more responsibly online and the internet will be a safer place to carry
on daily lifestyle routines.
Using techniques supported by existing literature, this study applied LRAT and social
learning theory to cybercrime offending, specifically harassment, stalking, impersonation, and
sexting, among a sample of college students. The current study found moderate support for the
application of both LRAT and social learning theory to cybercrime offending. While the study
yielded significant results, it is important to keep in mind the limitations previously discussed. It
is the hope of the researcher that the current study will help to further the understanding of and
literature on cybercrime and offending.
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Appendix I: Survey Instrument/ Code Book
Informed Consent Form
You are invited to participate in this research study. The following information is
provided in order to help you make an informed decision whether or not to participate. If you
have any questions please do not hesitate to ask. If you have a social networking site, and are a
student of Bridgewater State University (BSU), and are enrolled in one of the general studies
courses you are eligible to participate in the research.
IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A SOCIAL NETWORKING SITE THAT IS
CURRENTLY ACTIVE OR ARE UNDER 18 YEARS OLD PLEASE DO NOT
PARTICIPATE IN THIS SURVEY.
The purpose of this study is to examine individuals’ risky online and offline behavior, social
media habits, and cases of victimization. Participation in this study will require approximately 20
minutes of your time.
There are some risks and discomforts associated with this survey, particularly in regards
to sexual victimization and illegal activities. If you feel uncomfortable at any time during the
survey or would like some information about where you can go to get help, the researcher has a
sheet containing various sources. The information gained from this study may help us to
minimize future victimization risk and help guide the general population to realize the
seriousness of risky behavior both online and offline.
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You are free to decide not to participate in
this study and withdraw at any time without adversely affecting your relationship with the
investigators or BSU. Your decision will not result in any loss of benefits to which you are
otherwise entitled. You are also free to decline to answer any questions that make you
uncomfortable. Upon your request to withdraw, all information pertaining to you will be
destroyed. If you choose to participate, please note that all information collected will remain
anonymous and will have no bearing on your academic standing or services from the University.
Your response will be considered only in combination with those from other participants. The
information obtained in the study may be published in scientific journals or presented at
scientific meetings but your identity will remain anonymous.
Your patience in allowing the researcher to read this Implied Consent Form to you is
deeply appreciated. If you choose to participate in this study, please complete the survey. Thank
you for your anticipated participation in this study.
By turning this page and beginning the survey, you are acknowledging that your current
questions have been answered in language that you understand.
Sincerely,
Ashley Bettencourt
Masters candidate
The Bridgewater State University Institutional Review Board has approved this project for the
Protection of Human Subjects (Phone: 508-531-1242).
Study Author
Ashley Bettencourt
Department of Criminal Justice
Bridgewater State University
Maxwell Library RM 311M

Faculty Sponsor
Kyung-Shick Choi, Ph.D
Department of Criminal Justice
Bridgewater State University
Maxwell Library RM 311M
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Bridgewater, MA
Tel: 508-989-8555
Email: Abettencourt@student.bridgew.edu

Bridgewater, MA
Tel: 508-531-2566
Email: Kchoi@bridgew.edu

Lifestyle Behaviors and Victimization Survey
Please only participate in the following survey if you have at least one social
networking site profile that you actively use.

Part A: Demographics
Instructions: Please complete the section below by filling in or checking off the selection that
best suits you.
A1.

How old are you?

___________ years old.

A2.

What year are you in school?
( ) Freshman
( ) Sophomore
( ) Junior
( ) Senior
( ) other _________

A3.

What is your race?
( ) African American
( ) Asian/ Southeast Asia
( ) Caucasian
( ) Latino
( ) Native American
( ) Pacific Islander
( ) Indian
( ) Other ___________________________

A4.

What is your gender?
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__________________

A5.

What is your relationship status?
( ) Single
( ) Married
( ) Divorced
( ) Separated
( ) Dating
( ) Other______________

A6.

What is your current academic status?
( ) Full time (at least 12 full credits a semester)
( ) Part time (less than 12 credits a semester)

A7.

Approximately, how many hours do you spend studying a day, not including class time?

_____________hours __________mins

A8.

What is your GPA?
_____________

A9.

Are you currently employed?
( ) Yes
( ) No

A9.1. If yes, on average, how many hours a week do you work?

____________ Hours/week
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A10.

What group activities are you involved in at school? (Check all that apply and write in
groups if not listed)
( ) Fraternity
( ) Sorority
( ) ROTC
( ) Student Government Association
( ) Intramural Sports (Consists of sports programs that are not highly competitive;
anyone who wants to can play) ________________________ (indicate which one)
( ) Program Committee (purpose is to organize events around campus)
( ) School Sports Team _____________ (indicate which one) (Ex. Soccer, Softball,
Football)
( ) Other ______________________

A11.

What is your primary major? (Please check one)
( ) College of Science and Math (Biology, Chemical Science, Computer Science,
Geography, Geology, Mathematics, Physics)
( ) College of Humanities and Social Sciences (Anthropology, Art,
Communication, Criminal Justice, Economics, English, History, Music,
Philosophy, Political Science, Psychology, Social Work, Theater and
Dance, Foreign Languages)
( ) College of Business (Accounting and Finance, Aviation Science,

Management)

( ) College of Education and Allied Studies (Counselor Education, Elementary
and Early Childhood Education, Movement Arts, Health Promotion and Leisure
Studies, Secondary Education and Professional Programs, Special Education and
Communication Disorders)

Part B: Online Lifestyle activities
Instructions: The following questions focus on your online lifestyle. Please check or write in
the appropriate answer.
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B1.

Do you own a smartphone? (If yes continue onto question B1.1 below)
( ) Yes
( ) No
B1.1. On average, how many hours a day do you spend on your cellphone? (Exclude

phone calls but do include app use, texting, internet use, and Netflix)

______________ Hours __________ Mins

B2.

Do you own a tablet? (tablets include: Ipads, Kindle, Samsung, Sony, Windows, etc. ) (If
yes please answer question B2.1)
( ) Yes
( ) No
B2.1. On average, how many hours a day do you spend on your tablet? (Include all
activities done on tablet including Netflix, hulu, etc)

_______________Hours ____________Mins

B3.

Which device do you use most for accessing the Internet? (Pick one)
(

) Desktop

(

) Laptop

(

) Smartphone

(

) Tablet PC (IPad, Windows Surface, Kindle)

(

) Smart TV

(

) Other ______________
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B4. Please select the response based on the statement regarding Internet use below.
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

No
Opinion

Agree

Strongly
Agree

I don’t use my actual name
while on the Internet.
I tend to conceal my
identity while on the
Internet.
I don’t feel like the people
I interact with online are
real people.
I don’t care about others’
opinions while on the
Internet.
It is difficult to build a
friendship due to lack of
trust while on the Internet.
The Internet is totally
different from the physical
world.
Rules in the physical world
cannot be applied to the
Internet.
There are no guidelines on
the Internet.
Others’ feelings, freedom,
and rights must be
respected online.
We are less likely to be
punished due to violation
of laws on the Internet.
It is difficult to control
myself while on the
Internet.
I don’t care how other
people view me on the
Internet.
It is easy to violate laws
using the Internet.
I can easily commit crimes
on the Internet.
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Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

No
Opinion

Agree

Strongly
Agree

If I commit a crime on the
Internet, I won’t get
caught.
If I do not have my phone
on my person, I feel
anxious.
I cannot last an hour
without checking my
cellphone.
B5. What is your main purpose for using the Internet?
Please rank and number your top three choices from the list below:
____ Leisure (TV, Movie, Music)
Example:

____ Gaming

What is your main purpose for using the

____News/news articles

Internet? (Please rank and number your top

____ Information search/study

three choices from the list below:)

____ Job search

1 Leisure (TV, Movie, Music)

____ Chatting/messenger

____ Gaming

____ Blogging
____ Shopping
____ Finance/accounting

2

News/news articles

4

Information search/study

_____ Job search

____ Other______________

3

Chatting/messenger

B6. Please indicate whether you have engaged in any of the following online activities in the
past 12 months. (If yes, please indicate frequency)
Yes

No

Frequency

I have verbally harassed
someone on the Internet in
the past 12 months.
I have impersonated
someone online in the past
12 months.
I have spread rumors or
untruthful facts online in the
past 12 months.
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Yes

No

Frequency

I have threatened someone
online in the past 12 months.
I have repeatedly stalked a
person using the Internet in
the past 12 months.
I have sexually harassed a
person using the Internet in
the past 12 months.
I have suggested
participating in prostitution
to someone using the
Internet in the past 12
months.
I sent or uploaded illegal
sexual content through the
Internet in the past 12
months.
I have spread private photos
or movies taken without
consent over the Internet in
the past 12 months.
I have illegally downloaded
music/movies/games using
the Internet in the past 12
months.
Part C: Social Networking
For the following questions, please note that:
Social Networking Sites: websites that connect people together by allowing
them to share interests and activities with friends, family, colleagues, as well
as people with similar interests.
Smartphone: phones that have abilities similar to computers allowing users
to access the Internet as well as download applications or programs onto
their phone.

C1.

Do you use social networking sites?
( ) Yes
( ) No
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C2.

Which device do you use for Social Networking the most? (Please pick only one)
( ) Desktop Computer
( ) Laptop
( ) Tablet PC
( ) Smartphone
( ) Other ____________

C3.

At what age, did you start using Social Networking? Examples Facebook, Myspace,
Twitter.
____________years old

C4.

What Social Networking sites do you belong to? (Please rank by your personal use and
number all that apply and write in those not listed)
____ Facebook
____ Snapchat
____ Twitter
____ Instagram
____ Other ___________________

Example:
What Social Networking sites do
you belong to?
1 Facebook
_____ Snapchat
2 Twitter

C5.

On average, how many hours/minutes do you spend
day on Social Networking Sites?
3 aInstagram
________Hrs ________Mins

C6.

_____ Other_____________

On average, how many hours/minutes a day do you spend actively instant messaging?
(Facebook chat, AIM, MSN messenger, Etc.)

________Hrs ________Mins

C7.

On average, how many hours/minutes a day do you spend talking on the phone?

________Hrs _________Mins
C8.

On average, how many hours/minutes a day do you spend text messaging?
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__________Hrs ________Mins

C9.

On average, how many hours/minutes a day do you spend video chatting? (Facetime,
Skype, Etc.)

___________Hrs _________Mins

C10.

What is your main purpose for using Social Networking sites? Please rank and number
your top 3 choices chosen from the list below.
____ Friendship, dating and
conversation
____ Loneliness/removing stress
____ Information and knowledge
____ Sharing common interest
____ Entertainment and leisure
____ Self-expression

Example:
What is your main purpose for using Social
Networking sites?
3 Friendship, dating and conversation
_____ Loneliness/removing stress
2 Information and knowledge
_____ Sharing common interest

____ Discussion of societal issues
1 Entertainment and leisure

C11.

______ Self-expression

What percentage of the people you interact with online do you know in the physical
world?

C12.

C13.

(

) I don’t know them 0-20%

(

) I don’t really know them 21-40%

(

) I know them 41-60%

(

) I know them well 61-80%

(

) I know them very well 81-100%

______ Discussion of societal issues

Do you have Social Networking applications on your cell phone?
(

) Yes

(

) No

Have you ever sent explicit photos of yourself via Social Networking sites?
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(

) Yes

( ) No

C14.

Have you ever sent explicit photos of yourself via texting?
( ) Yes
( ) No

C15: Instructions: The following questions regard online lifestyle activities. Please select
the response that best fits you.
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

No
Opinion

Agree

Strongly
Agree

I share most events in my
life through pictures on
Social Networking sites.
I express my opinions
and feelings via Social
Networking sites.
I have set strict privacy
settings on who can see
my pictures on Social
Networking sites.
I have friends/followers
on Social Networking
sites who I do not know.
I visited web sites that
were new to me during
the last 12 months.
I have downloaded free
games from unknown
web sites during the last
12 months.
I have downloaded free
music that interested me
from unknown web sites
during the last 12 months.
I have downloaded free
movies that interested me
from unknown websites
during the last 12 months.
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Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

No
Opinion

Agree

Strongly
Agree

I opened any attachment
in the e-mails that I
received during the last
12 months.
I opened any files or
attachments I received
through my instant
messenger during the last
12 months.
I clicked on any website
links in an e-mail that I
received during the last
12 months.
I clicked on a pop-up
message that interested
me during the last 12
months.
I offer lots of personal
information on Social
Networking sites.
I frequently write about
my life on Social
Networking sites.
I express my opinion
with honesty on Social
Networking sites.
I am very exposed to
crime victimization on
Social Networking sites.
I tend to express my
feelings on Social
Networking sites.
I express myself on very
sensitive issues on Social
Networking sites.
I can be a target for
criminals based on my
online behaviors.
I install and update
antivirus programs to
block the information that
I don’t want on my
computer.
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Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

No
Opinion

Agree

Strongly
Agree

I am very cautious to
avoid victimization on
Social Networking sites.
I spend more time on
Social Networking sites
than I expected.
I update the privacy
settings on my Social
Networking sites
frequently.
Part D: Online Social Learning
For the following questions, please note:
Cyber-Friends: Friends who you only interact with in an online setting (not in person).
Cyber-laws: Laws or regulations specific to the online world such as cyber-bullying.

D1. Please
Social Networking Sites: websites that connect people together by allowing them to share
select the
interests and activities with friends, family, colleagues, as well as people with similar
best
interests.
response
based on
the statements below regarding your online social learning experiences.
Strongly
Disagree
No
Agree
Strongly
Disagree
Opinion
Agree
I have received
online safety
education in the past.
One of my role
models violated cyber
laws.
My cyber friends
commit crimes on the
Internet.
Cyber friends share
similar ideas.
Cyber friends have
very close
relationships.
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Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

No
Opinion

Agree

Strongly
Agree

If anyone around me
uploads inappropriate
content to the
Internet, the content
will be removed.
I’ve learned how to
violate Internet laws
through my peers
online.
People who commit
crimes on the Internet
are treated well
around me.
Committing a crime
on the Internet is very
common to me.
If I commit a crime
on the Internet, I
won’t be identified.
I can easily commit a
crime on the Internet.
I won’t feel guilty if I
violate a law on the
Internet.
I won’t be blamed if I
violate laws on the
Internet.
Committing a crime
on the Internet is
acceptable to me
I frequently see my
close friends
committing crimes
online.
I can trust my cyber
friends.
I tend to
communicate with
people using Social
Networking sites.
I have a strong bond
with people on Social
Networking Sites
who harass people.
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Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

No
Opinion

Agree

Strongly
Agree

Being a member of a
Social Networking
Site means a lot to
me.
There are many
friends on Social
Networking Sites
who can help me and
I can trust.
I have a person online
who can help me
make important
decisions.
There are people who
I feel comfortable
discussing personal
problems with on
Social Networking
sites.
Social Networking
sites can strengthen
relationships with
people I already
know.

Part E: Physical Lifestyle
For the following questions, please note that:

Physical Lifestyle: For the purposes of this study physical lifestyle only
pertains to behaviors that can be seen as risky such as drinking, drug use,
and frequenting clubs or bars.

Instructions: Please indicate the frequency in which you engage in the following actions. If
you do not engage in the action, please indicate 0.
E1.

Approximately, how many nights a month do you go to a club or bar?

_______ Nights per month
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E2.

Approximately, how many nights a month do you attend a house party?

_________ Nights per month

E3.

Approximately, how many nights a month do you casually go out with your friends?
(Examples movie night, sleepovers, sporting events, shopping)

_________ Nights per month

E4.

Approximately, how many drinks a night do you have when you go out?

_________ Drinks per night

E5.

Approximately, how many times in a week do you smoke marijuana?

__________ Times per week

E6.

Have you experimented with hard drugs in the past 12 months? (Examples: cocaine,
heroin, Vicodin, Percocet, Oxycontin, ecstasy, etc.)
(

) Yes

(

) No

Frequency_________

E7.

Please select the best response based on the statements regarding physical lifestyle.
Strongly
Disagree
No
Agree
Strongly
Disagree
Opinion
Agree
I have driven drunk in
the past 12 months.
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I have driven
recklessly (speeding,
erratic driving, etc) in
the past 12 months.
I go out drinking more
than 4 times per week.
I regularly engage in
school sponsored
activities (fundraisers,
game nights, sporting
events, etc).
I have gotten
speeding/reckless
driving tickets in the
past 12 months.
In the last 12 months I
have had a boyfriend
or girlfriend.
I have had one-night
stands in college in the
past 12 months. (One
night stands only
include sexual
intercourse).

Part F: Victimization
For the following questions, please note that:
Social Networking Sites: websites that connect people together by allowing them to
share interests and activities with friends, family, colleagues, as well as people with
similar interests.

Obscene: words or actions that make you feel uncomfortable.

F1.

Please indicate whether any of these instances of victimization have happened to

Catfishing:
impersonating
else online
andthe
interacting
with others.
you. If your
answer issomeone
yes, please
indicate
frequency.

Yes

No

Frequency
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Has anyone used obscene
language while online with you in
the past 12 months?
Has anyone said something
obscene in an email to you that
made you feel uncomfortable in
the past 12 months?
Has anyone said something
obscene on a social networking
site to you in the past 12 months?
Has anyone used obscene
language with you through text
message in the past 12 months?
Has anybody ever groped your
butt, breast, or any other part of
your body inappropriately without
consent in the past 12 months?
Has anyone ever tried to expose
your private part(s) in the past 12
months?
Has anybody coerced you into
having oral sex in the past 12
months?
Has anyone coerced you to have
sexual intercourse in the past 12
months?
Have you ever been impersonated
by another person online in the
past 12 months?
Yes

No

Frequency

Have you ever been threatened by
someone in the past 12 months?
Have you been stalked by
someone in the past 12 months?
Have you been sexually harassed
by someone in the past 12 months?
Has anyone suggested prostitution
over the Internet to you in the past
12 months?
Has anyone spread your private
photos or movies over the Internet
without your consent in the past 12
months?
Have you received illegal sexual
contents through the Internet
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without your consent in the past 12
months?
Has someone on the Internet
verbally harassed you in the past
12 months?
Has someone on the Internet
spread rumors or untruthful facts
about you in the past 12 months?
Has someone online in the past 12
months threatened you?
Has someone online stalked you in
the past 12 months?
Has someone online sexually
harassed you in the past 12
months?
Has anyone coerced you into
prostitution through online means?
Have you ever participated in
prostitution?
Have you “catfished” someone
using social networking sites in the
past 12 months?
Have you been “catfished” by
someone in the past 12 months?
Has someone used your pictures or
personal information without your
permission in the past 12 months?

Yes

No

Frequency

Have you felt fear of victimization
on social networking sites in the
past 12 months?
Have you felt fear of harassment
on social networking sites in the
past 12 months?
Have you felt fear of sexual
harassment on social networking
sites in the past 12 months?
Have you felt fear of unwanted
sexual content on social
networking sites in the past 12
months?
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Have you felt fear of prostitution
on social networking sites in the
past 12 months?
Have you felt fear of your privacy
being invaded online in the past 12
months?
Appendix II: Descriptive Statistics
Statistics
Age
Class status
Race
Gender
N
Valid
274
274
273
273
Missing
0
0
1
1
Mean
21.3248
2.8577 3.1575
.5092
Std. Error of Mean
.17596
.05728 .07099
.03075
Median
21.0000
3.0000 3.0000
1.0000
a
Mode
21.00
2.00
3.00
1.00
Std. Deviation
2.91271
.94820 1.17296
.50812
Variance
8.484
.899
1.376
.258
Skewness
4.314
-.153
2.830
.048
Std. Error of Skewness
.147
.147
.147
.147
Kurtosis
27.576
-.935 10.747
-1.795
Std. Error of Kurtosis
.293
.293
.294
.294
Range
29.00
4.00
7.00
2.00
Minimum
18.00
1.00
1.00
.00
Maximum
47.00
5.00
8.00
2.00
Sum
5843.00
783.00 862.00
139.00
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown

academic
status
273
1
1.0549
.01382
1.0000
1.00
.22829
.052
3.928
.147
13.527
.294
1.00
1.00
2.00
288.00

Class status
Frequency Percent
Valid Freshman
19
6.9
Sophomore
86
31.4
Junior
senior
other
Total

86
81
2
274

31.4
29.6
.7
100.0

Valid
Percent
6.9
31.4

Cumulative
Percent
6.9
38.3

31.4
29.6
.7
100.0

69.7
99.3
100.0
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Gender
Frequency Percent
Valid
female
135
49.3
male
137
50.0
other
1
.4
Total
273
99.6
Missing System
1
.4
Total
274
100.0

Valid
Percent
49.5
50.2
.4
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
49.5
99.6
100.0

White vis Non White
Valid
Cumulative
Frequency Percent
Percent
Percent
Valid White
228
83.2
83.2
83.2
Non_Whit
46
16.8
16.8
100.0
e
Total

274

100.0

100.0

academic status

Valid

full time
student

part time
student
Total
Missing System
Total

Frequency Percent
258
94.2

Valid
Percent
94.5

Cumulative
Percent
94.5
100.0

15

5.5

5.5

273
1
274

99.6
.4
100.0

100.0

*Our sample is not a representative sample reflecting BSU.
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Table 1. Comparison of Sample and Population on Available Demographic
Characteristics. Sample (N=274)
Study Sample (N=274)
Demographic
Undergraduate Population
Characteristic
(N=9,684)
Age
Mean age

22

21.32

Female

58% (n=5,635)

49.5% (n=135)

Male

42% (n=4,049)

50.2% (n=137)

Gender

Other

0.4% (n=1)

Race
White

83% (n=8,065)

83.2% (n=228)

Non-White

17% (n=1,619)

16.8% (n=46)

Freshman

19% (n=1,826)

6.9% (n=19)

Sophomore

21% (n=2,074)

31.4% (n=86)

Junior

27% (n=2,594)

31.4% (n=86)

Senior

32% (n=3,067)

29.6% (n=81)

Other

1% (n=133)

0.7% (n=2)

Class
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Appendix III: Independent Variables
LRAT Theory

A. Online Lifestyle
OL-ID: B4.1 + B4.2
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha Based
on
Cronbach's Standardized
N of
Alpha
Items
Items
.774
.776
2
Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean
Scale
Corrected
if Item
Variance if
Item-Total
Deleted
Item Deleted Correlation
2.5275
1.427
.633

Squared
Cronbach's
Multiple
Alpha if Item
Correlation
Deleted
.401
.a

actual name use on
internet
concealment of id
2.2601
1.245
.633
.401
.a
a. The value is negative due to a negative average covariance among items. This violates reliability
model assumptions. You may want to check item codings.
New_OL_ID: B4.1 +B4.2
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Statistics
New_OL_ID
N
Valid
Missing
Mean
Std. Error of Mean
Median
Mode
Std. Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis
Std. Error of Kurtosis
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum

273
1
4.7875
.12636
4.0000
4.00
2.08785
4.359
.600
.147
-.270
.294
8.00
2.00
10.00
1307.00

B. Target Attractiveness
Risky Social Networking Site Activity
OL-R.SS(Risky-SNS): C15.1+C15.2+C15.13+C15.14+C15.15+C15.18
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha Based
on
Cronbach's Standardized
N of
Alpha
Items
Items
.850
.850
7
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share most events in
my life through SNS
express my opinion
and feelings via SNS
offer a lot of personal
info on SNS
frequently write about
my life on SNS
express my opinion
with honesty on SNS
express my feelings on
SNS
express myself on
sensitive issues on
SNS

Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean
Scale
Corrected
if Item
Variance if
Item-Total
Deleted
Item Deleted Correlation
14.6767
24.084
.472

Squared
Cronbach's
Multiple
Alpha if Item
Correlation
Deleted
.306
.852

14.7556

22.027

.716

.593

.813

15.7406

26.329

.475

.356

.847

15.4060

22.310

.721

.573

.812

14.5150

23.405

.558

.383

.838

15.1241

21.060

.787

.660

.800

15.6165

24.841

.564

.375

.836

Statistics
New_OL_RSS
N
Valid
Missing
Mean
Std. Error of Mean
Median
Mode
Std. Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis
Std. Error of Kurtosis
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum

266
8
15.1241
.28138
15.0000
18.00
4.58912
21.060
.054
.149
-.296
.298
24.00
6.00
30.00
4023.00
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Online Risky Leisure Activity
OL-R.L(Risky-Leisure): C15.6 + C15.7 + C15.8
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha Based
on
Cronbach's Standardized
N of
Alpha
Items
Items
.695
.698
3
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downloaded free
games
downloaded free
music
downloaded free
movies

Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean
Scale
Corrected
if Item
Variance if
Item-Total
Deleted
Item Deleted Correlation
4.7640
4.279
.497

Squared
Cronbach's
Multiple
Alpha if Item
Correlation
Deleted
.248
.627

4.3184

3.285

.540

.292

.571

4.6704

3.831

.509

.260

.606

OL-R.L(Risky-Leisure): C15.6 + C15.7 + C15.8
Statistics
New_OL_RL
N
Valid
267
Missing
7
Mean
6.8764
Std. Error of Mean
.16667
Median
6.0000
Mode
6.00
Std. Deviation
2.72342
Variance
7.417
Skewness
.140
Std. Error of Skewness
.149
Kurtosis
-.710
Std. Error of Kurtosis
.297
Range
12.00
Minimum
3.00
Maximum
15.00
Sum
1836.00
Online Risky Vocational Activity
OL-R.V(Risky-Vocational): C15.9 + C15.10 + C15.11 + C15.12
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Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha Based
on
Cronbach's Standardized
N of
Alpha
Items
Items
.748
.736
4
Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean
Scale
Corrected
if Item
Variance if
Item-Total
Deleted
Item Deleted Correlation
opened any email
attachments
opened any files sent
through instant
message
clicked on any website
links
clicked on any pop ups

Squared
Multiple
Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

6.9087

6.366

.642

.485

.628

7.2738

6.833

.623

.411

.642

7.2890

6.718

.615

.401

.646

8.0038

9.744

.308

.121

.793

OL-R.V(Risky-Vocational): C15.9 + C15.10 + C15.11 + C15.12
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Statistics
New_OL_RV
N
Valid
Missing
Mean
Std. Error of Mean
Median
Mode
Std. Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis
Std. Error of Kurtosis
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum

263
11
9.8251
.21503
10.0000
8.00
3.48714
12.160
-.141
.150
-.774
.299
16.00
4.00
20.00
2584.00

C. Capable Guardianship
Digital Guardianship
Digital Guardianship: C15_20
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Statistics
install and upgrade antivirus programs
N
Valid
266
Missing
8
Mean
3.5564
Std. Error of Mean
.07222
Median
4.0000
Mode
4.00
Std. Deviation
1.17787
Variance
1.387
Skewness
-.660
Std. Error of Skewness
.149
Kurtosis
-.554
Std. Error of Kurtosis
.298
Range
4.00
Minimum
1.00
Maximum
5.00
Sum
946.00

Security Management
New_OL_SM(Security-Mangement): C15.3+C15.23
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Statistics
New_OL_SS
N
Valid
Missing
Mean
Std. Error of Mean
Median
Mode
Std. Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis
Std. Error of Kurtosis
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum

260
14
7.1538
.11034
7.0000
8.00
1.77917
3.165
-.487
.151
.061
.301
8.00
2.00
10.00
1860.00

Physical Risky Lifestyle
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha Based
on
Cronbach's Standardized
N of
Alpha
Items
Items
.676
.693
5
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driven drunk in last 12
months
driven recklessly in
past 12 months
go out drinking more
than 4x a week
have gotten
speeding/reckless
driving tickets in past
12 months
have had one-night
stands in college in the
past 12 months

Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean
Scale
Corrected
if Item
Variance if
Item-Total
Deleted
Item Deleted Correlation
7.8721
9.700
.469

Squared
Cronbach's
Multiple
Alpha if Item
Correlation
Deleted
.252
.607

7.1977

8.712

.483

.264

.604

8.2209

11.325

.507

.259

.614

8.2016

11.617

.371

.144

.652

7.6705

9.584

.398

.189

.646

COMPUTE New_RPL=E7.1 + E7.2 + E7.3 + E7.5 + E7.7.
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Statistics
New_RPL
N
Valid
Missing
Mean
Std. Error of Mean
Median
Mode
Std. Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis
Std. Error of Kurtosis
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum

258
16
9.7907
.23891
10.000
0
5.00
3.8375
1
14.726
.358
.152
-.844
.302
15.00
5.00
20.00
2526.0
0
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Social Learning Theory
Differential Association (DA)
COMPUTE New_DA=D1.2 + D1.3 + D1.7 + D1.8 + D1.9 + D1.15 + D1.18.
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha Based
on
Cronbach's Standardized
N of
Alpha
Items
Items
.822
.821
7

one of role models
violated cyber laws
my cyber friends
commit crimes on
internet
learned how to violate
internet laws through
peers
people who commit
crime on internet are
treated well
committing a crime on
internet is common to
me
frequently see my
close friends comming
crime on internet
have a strong bond
with people on SNS
who harass people

Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean
Scale
Corrected
if Item
Variance if
Item-Total
Deleted
Item Deleted Correlation
13.1202
15.842
.572

Squared
Cronbach's
Multiple
Alpha if Item
Correlation
Deleted
.417
.797

12.9302

15.676

.496

.365

.809

12.9031

14.524

.646

.453

.783

12.7287

15.770

.541

.370

.802

13.0116

14.595

.633

.448

.786

13.0930

14.513

.633

.449

.786

13.3760

16.523

.426

.208

.819
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COMPUTE New_DA=D1.2 + D1.3 + D1.7 + D1.8 + D1.9 + D1.15 + D1.18.
Statistics
New_DA
N
Valid
258
Missing
16
Mean
15.1938
Std. Error of Mean
.28043
Median
15.0000
Mode
14.00
Std. Deviation
4.50435
Variance
20.289
Skewness
.025
Std. Error of Skewness
.152
Kurtosis
-.468
Std. Error of Kurtosis
.302
Range
21.00
Minimum
7.00
Maximum
28.00
Sum
3920.00

Definition (D)
COMPUTE New_D=B4.10 + B4.13 + B4.14 + B4.15 + D1.10 + D1.11 + D1.12 + D1.13 +
D1.14 .
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Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha Based
on
Cronbach's Standardized
N of
Alpha
Items
Items
.813
.822
9
Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean
Scale
Corrected
if Item
Variance if
Item-Total
Deleted
Item Deleted Correlation
less likely to be
punished for breaking
laws online
easy to violate laws on
internet
easy to commit crimes
on internet
will not get caught if i
commit crime on
internet
commit a crime on
internet i won't be
identified
easily commit crime on
internet
won't feel guilty if i
violate a law on
internet
won't be blamed if i
violate laws on internet
committing a crime on
the internet is
acceptable to me

Squared
Multiple
Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

19.4598

28.065

.301

.196

.824

18.8927

27.865

.364

.396

.814

19.2720

26.106

.521

.519

.793

20.1034

26.947

.549

.401

.790

20.0996

26.959

.560

.463

.789

19.5134

24.966

.620

.484

.780

20.1418

26.238

.596

.565

.784

20.1839

26.551

.632

.568

.782

20.3257

27.474

.535

.553

.793

COMPUTE New_D=B4.10 + B4.13 + B4.14 + B4.15 + D1.10 + D1.11 + D1.12 + D1.13 +
D1.14 .
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Statistics
New_D
N
Valid
Missing
Mean
Std. Error of Mean
Median
Mode
Std. Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis
Std. Error of Kurtosis
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum

261
13
22.2490
.35634
22.0000
20.00
5.75687
33.142
-.005
.151
-.151
.300
27.00
9.00
36.00
5807.00
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Appendix IV: Dependent Variables
Cyber Harassment
COMPUTE New_C_H=B6_1 + B6_3 + B6_4.
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha Based
on
Cronbach's Standardized
N of
Alpha
Items
Items
.663
.692
3
Statistics
New_C_H
N
Valid
Missing
Mean
Std. Error of Mean
Median
Mode
Std. Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis
Std. Error of Kurtosis
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum

272
2
.1250
.02799
.0000
.00
.46163
.213
4.301
.148
19.864
.294
3.00
.00
3.00
34.00

Cyber Impersonation
Impersonation: B6_2
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Statistics
New_B6_2
N
Valid
Missing
Mean
Std. Error of Mean
Median
Mode
Std. Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis
Std. Error of Kurtosis
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum

272
2
.0221
.00892
.0000
.00
.14715
.022
6.544
.148
41.130
.294
1.00
.00
1.00
6.00

Cyber Stalking
Cyber-stalking: B6_5
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Statistics
New_B6_5
N
Valid
Missing
Mean
Std. Error of Mean
Median
Mode
Std. Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis
Std. Error of Kurtosis
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum

273
1
.0403
.01192
.0000
.00
.19701
.039
4.701
.147
20.251
.294
1.00
.00
1.00
11.00

Sexting
Sexting: B6_9
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Statistics
B6_9
N
Valid
Missing
Mean
Std. Error of Mean
Median
Mode
Std. Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis
Std. Error of Kurtosis
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum

273
1
.0220
.00889
.0000
.00
.14688
.022
6.557
.147
41.297
.294
1.00
.00
1.00
6.00

Appendix V: Negative Binomial Regression Analysis
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Online Identity/Gender v. Cyber Harassment
Parameter

B

Hypothesis Test
Std.
95% Wald
Error Confidence Interval

.2954
.589

Online Identity
(LE) /Gender

Exp(B)

Lower

upper

Wald ChiSquare

df Sig.

-1.168

-.010

3.980

1

.046* .555

Risky Online Social Networking Site Activity v. Cyber Stalking
Parameter

Online Risky
Social
Networking
Site Behavior

B

.221

Std.
Error

.0921

95% Wald
Confidence
Interval

Hypothesis Test

Exp(B)

Lower

upper

Wald
ChiSquare

df

Sig.

.040

.401

5.751

1

.016*

1.247

Risky Online Leisure Activity v. Sexting
Parameter

Online Risky
Leisure
Behavior

B

.493

Std.
Error

.2643

95% Wald
Confidence
Interval

Hypothesis Test

Exp(B)

Lower

upper

Wald
ChiSquare

df

Sig.

-.025

1.011

3.477

1

.062

1.637

Risky Online Vocational Activity v. Cyber Impersonation

Phillips 89

Parameter

Online
Risky
Vocational
Behavior
(LE)

B

Std.
Error

.547 .3118

95% Wald
Confidence
Interval

Hypothesis Test

Exp(B)

Lower

upper

Wald
ChiSquare

df

Sig.

-.037

1.185

3.392

1

.066

1.776

Differential Association v. Cyber Harassment
Parameter

B

Differential
Association (SL)

Hypothesis Test
Std.
95% Wald
Error Confidence Interval

.181 .0547

Exp(B)

Lower

upper

Wald ChiSquare

df Sig.

.074

.289

10.997

1

.001* 1.199

Definition v. Cyber Harassment
Parameter

B

Definition (SL)

Hypothesis Test
Std.
95% Wald
Error Confidence Interval

.144 .0465

Exp(B)

Lower

upper

Wald ChiSquare

df Sig.

.053

.235

9.573

1

.002* 1.155

Table 3. Inferential Statistics: Negative Binomial Regression
Cyber Harassment

Cyber Stalking

Cyber
Impersonation

Sexting
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B

SE

Odds
Ratio
(Exp(B))

B

SE

LRAT
Exposure to
Motivated
Offenders
Online
- .30
.56*
lifestyle/
.59
Gender
Target
Attractiveness
Risky online
.22 .09
SNS activity
Risky online
leisure activity
Risky online
vocational
activity
Social
Learning
Differential
.18 .05 1.20***
association
Definitions
.14 .05 1.16**

Odds
Ratio
(Exp(B))

B

SE

Odds
Ratio
(Exp(B))

B

SE

Odds
Ratio
(Exp(B))

1.25*
.50 .26
.57 .31

1.64

1.78

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001

Appendix VI: Bivariate Correlation Analysis
Table 4. Victim/Offender Overlap- Sexting
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Sexting- Victimization Pearson Correlation

Sexting- Victimization

Sexting- Offense

1

.130

Sig. (2-tailed)
Sum of Squares and
Cross-products

Sexting- Offense

.032*
22.719

1.473

Covariance

.083

.005

N

274

273

Pearson Correlation

.130

1

Sig. (2-tailed)

.032*

Sum of Squares and
Cross-products

1.473

5.868

Covariance

.005

.022

N

273

273

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
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